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After surveying past and present attempts to determine the best way of se-
lecting judges, Professor Carrington concludes in Judicial Independence and
Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts that, as Chief Justice
Traynor observed, “there is no unobjectionable way to decide who shall judge
or to judge those who do.”1  There is broad agreement over how to select legis-
lators and executive officials; that the “least unobjectionable” method of judi-
cial selection remains elusive after more than two centuries is a reflection of
our difficulties in defining the proper limits of the judicial role.  As Professor
Carrington’s discussion of the California Supreme Court suggests, what is ille-
gitimate judicial activism to some may be only courageous constitutional appli-
cation to others.2
With the proper role of judging so unsettled, it is hardly surprising that
Americans also do not agree on what training, experience or temperament will
produce the best judge.  And even for those with settled views on these ques-
tions, it is not clear which method of selection produces what kind of judge.
Under any system, we rely on the almost unattainable hope that some facet of
the political process will generate a powerful official whose performance will be
above and apart from politics.
For these reasons, any discussion about good and bad ways to choose and
retain judges must be largely subjective.  Within these limitations, however,
most people would agree that some state judiciaries perform better than others.
And however much the local legal, political or civic culture may explain these
differences, it seems inevitable that the structure of the judicial system, includ-
ing the selection method, must also be in part responsible.  In short, while there
may not be a “right” way to choose judges, there are probably several “wrong”
ways.
One wrong way, I am convinced, is the contested partisan election system
used in my home state of Texas.  Professor Carrington charitably concludes
that the reformers who pushed for elected judiciaries in the second half of the
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nineteenth century did not foresee the resulting complications, such as unquali-
fied judges selected by an uninformed electorate, political parties handing out
judicial positions as patronage plums, the necessity for raising campaign funds
from problematic sources, and the nastiness of sound-bite campaigns.3  I sus-
pect that most of these problems were always with us, with longer ballots and
modern campaign techniques merely exacerbating their effects.
What clearly is new, and what has caused so much attention to be focused
on how problematic judicial elections are, is the amount of resources that inter-
ested persons and groups are willing to expend to influence the results of judi-
cial elections.  While Texas may have been a pioneer in high-dollar judicial
campaigns, it is no longer alone:  On a per-voter basis, many states now have
equally or more expensive campaigns, especially for their highest court.  Re-
versing or containing this trend is at the heart of most of Professor Carrington’s
suggestions.
But I am concerned that any new reforms not merely resurrect old deficien-
cies or create new ones.  Any changes must be scrutinized for unintended con-
sequences.  As Justice Astbury quipped:  “Reform! Reform!  Aren’t things bad
enough already?”4
II
THE MERITS OF MERIT SELECTION
I do not share Professor Carrington’s profound skepticism about the viabil-
ity of retention elections.  Clearly it is troubling that special interest groups
have poured huge sums of money into negative and sometimes misleading anti-
retention campaigns.  But since the triple-whammy California Supreme Court
rejection in 1986, only three state high court judges were not retained—Walter
Urbigkit (Wyoming, 1992), David Lanphier (Nebraska, 1996), and Penny
White (Tennessee, 1996).  While there have been other occasional challenges in
California, Florida, Indiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and perhaps elsewhere, the
plain fact is that judges are far more likely to lose for far more inscrutable rea-
sons in contested elections rather than retention elections.  I suspect that most
judges from Alabama, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Nevada, Texas, or
Washington would be quite surprised to see their counterparts in retention
election states labeled as “sitting ducks” facing the “potential nightmare” of an
election that “may be no longer politically viable . . . and is now possibly . . . the
worst kind of election to conduct for judges who have been sitting for long
enough to acquire a record that can be mischaracterized.”5
I agree that the modern trend of politicizing retention elections is most dis-
quieting.  But almost all judges are retained, and the mean affirmative vote for
retention across the nation for trial and appellate judges has actually increased
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in the last few cycles.6  Moreover, the very nature of the merit selection process
suggests that not every judge will be contested—special interests are unlikely to
fund a vigorous “no” campaign unless there is at least a fair prospect of a more
sympathetic successor being named.  Finally, it surely is instructive that no state
has ever abandoned retention elections once they have been instituted.
Furthermore, I do not share Professor Carrington’s disdain for the efficacy
of the retention election process.  How can it be a “masquerade to put political
power in the hands of . . . [an] elite,” a view he regards as not without reason,
when the voters are allowed to pass on the tenure of every judge in their juris-
diction?7  In reality, contested judicial elections are less democratic in opera-
tion.  Even in Texas, where judicial races have been highly politicized for two
decades, far more judges are unopposed than opposed each election cycle.8
And due to the vagaries of political fortune, bad judges are sometimes unop-
posed while good judges are challenged, or bad judges are opposed by bad can-
didates, or good judges are opposed by other good candidates.  Far too often
there is so little information and so many candidates that voters are powerless
to exercise any meaningful choice.  A simple yes or no on each individual
judge, far from “diminish[ing] the role of the electorate in controlling” the judi-
ciary,9 should permit a more meaningful public role.  If judges of unsuitable
temperament, insufficient industry, or unacceptable philosophy are defeated
often enough, the appointing authority will take note in selecting their re-
placements.
Finally, I do not share Professor Carrington’s apparent view that “it is only
the highest state courts that wield substantial political power” such that they
“are on that account arguably legitimate objects of partisan political concern.”10
It is true that high courts frequently promulgate rules of procedure and evi-
dence, but sometimes lower courts do so as well.  High courts often wield ad-
ministrative power, but lower court judges sometimes have equal or greater
authority within their own districts.  As with all courts, high court judicial deci-
sions are informed by the text of the applicable provision, statute, treaty, rule
or contract in issue, or by ancient and powerful traditions of respect for prece-
dent.  While high courts may theoretically have the final say, practical con-
straints usually preclude them from hearing more than a fraction of cases where
review is sought.  And even where they do exercise review, high courts are gen-
erally bound by the factual determinations made below.  Like other judges,
high court judges should not have platforms, agendas, or constituencies; I
would not devise a selection system that suggests otherwise.
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III
THE FALLACY OF MONEY-FREE CAMPAIGNS
My second principal area of disagreement with Professor Carrington is his
apparent belief that the genie can be put back into the bottle, so that judicial
quality and confidence would be enhanced if only campaigns were once again
conducted without money, or at least without media campaigns.  Even if such
quiet campaigns did at one time produce a good judiciary, I am not at all sure
they would do so now.  First, the organized bar no longer wields the power to
encourage good candidates and discourage bad ones.  Even more importantly,
as Professor Carrington concedes, independent expenditures by those who
think they have something to gain cannot meaningfully be controlled.  A better
system is to have most contributions given directly to a candidate or committee,
where the records are more transparent, the content of campaign statements
are subject to the state judicial conduct codes, and the conduct of the candi-
dates can be fairly assessed by the voters.
I share Professor Carrington’s concern about the harmful effects, both real
and perceived, of abnormally large donations.  But he considers “contributions
of sufficient size to confirm the widely shared suspicion that the donor expects
something in return”11 to include any that, in the aggregate, produce enough
funds for a candidate to purchase “spot advertising on commercial television
prepared by highly paid craftsmen skilled in the art of disparaging public per-
sons.”12  I respectfully disagree.
Few judicial campaigns approach the cost of campaigns for governor, sena-
tor, or even mayor.  Furthermore, the total amount of money raised matters
less than whether the funds are raised from sources reflecting diverse back-
grounds and views.  I would be more concerned about a candidate who raises
$250,000 in twenty-five $10,000 increments than one who raises several times
that amount from thousands of small donors.  Similarly, I would be more con-
cerned about a candidate who raises $250,000 from one segment of the legal
profession than about one who raises several times that amount from those
with widely varying occupations, interests, and philosophies.  The “outlier”
contributions that cause the most concern can be met by realistic contribution
limits, set either by legislation or by judicial and professional conduct rules.
But for Professor Carrington, this may not be enough.  He would encourage
states to “limit the corrupting effects of expensive media campaigns” by prom-
ulgating rules to “disqualify a judge from sitting on a case in which any large
contributor is a party or has a significant economic stake in an issue coming be-
fore the court.”13  Although Carrington recognizes that “[t]here is very little
harm to the integrity of the courts caused by extravagant expenditures on
handbills, billboards, mail, and newspaper advertising,” he recognizes that can-
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didates prefer television and radio advertising for their “artificial means of cap-
turing the attention” of voters.14  While he opposes expenditure limits to
achieve this means, he finds disqualification a more “saleable response” that
would “eliminate serious fundraising, and thus force judicial candidates to re-
turn to the humble practices of the past when low-cost campaigns featured
handbills, posters, and calling cards as the primary media of communication.”15
Carrington’s principal criticism of disqualification rules is that the Supreme
Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence would make their enforcement against
third party “issues advocates” impossible to achieve.  While he notes without
comment the “administrative difficulties and costs to parties” of such a
scheme,16 he seems to have no doubt that money-free pseudo-campaigns would
produce a better judiciary.
This would be so, however, only if one believes that a good electorate need
not be an informed electorate.  However much voters may want in the abstract
to elect their judges, these are low salience elections that are almost never cov-
ered in any meaningful way by the free media.17 And absent free media, as the
Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo observed, “virtually every means of com-
municating ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money.”18
As any election consultant, professional psephologist, political reporter or
interested voter will confirm, current voters are not moved at all by Carring-
ton’s humble “handbills, posters and calling cards,” and only somewhat more
by his “billboards, mail and newspaper advertising.”  Politics today is less a par-
ticipatory than a spectator event to most Americans; such information as they
receive about candidates, particularly those for lower offices, is far more likely
to come from paid television or radio advertisements than from anywhere else.
As the Buckley Court went on to observe:  “The electorate’s increasing de-
pendence on television, radio, and other mass media for news and information
has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments
of effective political speech.”19
When the Supreme Court of Texas considered promulgating a rule to pro-
hibit judges from sitting in cases where parties or their lawyers were substan-
tial, albeit legal, contributors, we encountered these problems, among others:
                                                          
14. Id. at 117.
15. Id. at 114-15.
16. Id. at 115; see also Roy A. Schotland, Judicial Campaign Finance Could Work, NAT’L L.J.,
Nov. 23, 1998, at A21.
17. A 1999 statewide poll of 600 registered Texas voters showed that only two Supreme Court jus-
tices could be named by more than 1% of respondents.  I was named by 2%, and the junior justice, Al-
berto Gonzales, who is the immediate past Secretary of State of Texas, was named by 1%.  See Bruce
Davidson, Poll another argument for appointed judges, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS NEWS, Feb. 13, 1999,
at 7B (noting that the results of this poll were consistent with similar surveys conducted during the last
twenty years).
18. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
19. Id. at 19.
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What degree of lawyer involvement should be required?  Should the
ban extend just to lawyers who appear in court or sign pleadings, or
to all lawyers who work in a firm with a case?
How should business entities be treated?  Should the ban extend to
corporate litigants?  Should just the chief executive officer be pro-
hibited from giving, or should all officers, all directors, or all em-
ployees also be included?  What about their spouses?  Should any or
all stockholders be included in the ban?
What is a case before a court?  Should the ban extend to lawyers and
litigants whose case is about to be filed in a court, or whose case has
just concluded?  What if a pending case may later be appealed to a
court, or may later be remanded to that court?  What about cases
that are pending in another court, but will be won or lost based on
the precedent to be established in a case pending in the court for
which an election is being held?  What if a district has a central
docket?  Should lawyers and litigants who have any pending cases in
that district be prohibited from contributing to all judges?
Should the rules apply to challengers?  Should the ban apply only to
sitting judges, or should it extend to their challengers?  If the chal-
lenger is also a judge, should the ban apply to the dockets of both
judges?
A committee of the Alabama Supreme Court found similar difficulties in im-
plementing a state statute that required recusal of judges who took more than
nominal contributions from lawyers or litigants appearing in their courts.20
In most states with contested judicial elections, campaigns have run the
gamut from amply financed to literally penniless; only a handful could be called
“lavishly financed” by comparison to campaigns for executive or legislative of-
fices of similar dignity and prestige.  For most Texas judicial elections, voters
have no idea for whom they are voting.21  While many candidates for the Texas
Supreme Court and those trial courts that hear civil cases are quite well funded,
most other candidates, particularly those for courts specializing in criminal,
family, or juvenile matters, have quite sparse campaign treasuries.
The real differences in outcome between well-funded campaigns and those
run on Carrington’s shoe-leather method can be demonstrated by comparing
results for Texas Supreme Court races with those for its jurisprudential
equivalent in criminal cases, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.  During this
decade, there have been seventeen elections for the Texas Supreme Court22 and
                                                          
20. See Report to the Supreme Court of Alabama by the Alabama Supreme Court Standing Com-
mittee on Rules of Conduct and Canons of Judicial Ethics (Dec. 2, 1996).
21. See, e.g., Roy A. Schotland, Elective Judges’ Campaign Financing: Are State Judges’ Robes the
Emperor’s Clothes of American Democracy?, 2 J.L. & POL. 57, 86-87 (1985).
22. Of those 17 races, 15 were contested by both major parties in the general election, while two
were contested by one major party and a Libertarian.  Nine Republican and six Democratic nomina-
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seventeen elections for the Court of Criminal Appeals.23  All thirty-four races
have been contested, with fifty-four candidates on the primary or general elec-
tion ballot for the Supreme Court and seventy-nine for the Court of Criminal
Appeals.  In every Supreme Court election, at least one candidate has been
well-funded, while only a single candidate for the criminal court ran a television
campaign, and that campaign was quite modest.  Thus, the Supreme Court
races are a paradigmatic example of the sound-bite campaigns deplored by
Carrington, while the Court of Criminal Appeals races are an example of the
grassroots efforts he extols.
Which system has produced better results?  Any measure of good judicial
performance is undoubtedly subjective.24  As one of the subjects to be rated, I
should not suggest a comprehensive test.  But the objective data demonstrate
that money increases the likelihood that incumbent judges and judicial candi-
dates favored by the legal profession will win.  Money also increases the chance
that general election voters will distinguish between candidates on some basis
other than party affiliation.
For example, the winners of the State Bar of Texas’s judicial bar poll have
also won twelve of the seventeen Supreme Court races since 1990, but only nine
of the seventeen Court of Criminal Appeals races.  Incumbents have won
twelve Supreme Court justices races while losing only three, but incumbents
have won only six Court of Criminal Appeals races while losing the same num-
ber.  In Supreme Court races, every successful challenger was well funded, with
substantial support from the legal community and various organized groups.  In
contrast, five of the six losing criminal court incumbents won the State Bar of
Texas Bar Poll as well as most or all newspaper endorsements.25
                                                          
tions were contested in primaries, and two of the six Democratic nominations required runoffs because
no candidate won a majority of the votes.
23. Of those 17 races, 14 were contested by both major parties in the general election, while two
were contested by one major party and a Libertarian.  The sole candidate unopposed in a general elec-
tion won a contested primary.  In all, 11 Republican and 9 Democratic nominations were contested in
primaries, and six Republican and three Democratic nominations required runoffs because no candi-
date won a majority of the votes.  In 1990, the candidates for one position were chosen by the state
party executive committees when a vacancy on the court occurred after the primaries.
24. See, e.g., Justice Robert L. Brown, From Whence Cometh Our State Appellate Judges: Popular
Election Versus the Missouri Plan, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 313, 322 (1998).
25. The bar poll and electoral results for the six incumbent Court of Criminal Appeals judges de-
feated since 1990 are as follows:
Year Winning Challenger Vote Bar Poll Losing Incumbent Vote Bar Poll
1990 Baird (D) 51.4% 32.1% Berchelmann (R) 48.6% 48.8%
1990 Overstreet (D) 51.3 52.0   Sturns (R) 48.7 48.0   
1992 Meyers (R) 50.5 27.8   Benavides (D) 49.5 51.0   
1994 Mansfield (R) 54.0 14.9   Campbell (D) 46.0 71.8   
1996 Price (R) 53.8 11.1   Maloney (D) 46.2 53.3   
1998 Keasler (R) 54.0 16.7   Baird (D) 46.0 55.3   
Source:  Secretary of State of Texas, Official Election Returns; State Bar of Texas, Judicial Preference
Polls.
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Furthermore, in each of the five election cycles since 1990, the candidate
who led his or her ticket for the Texas Supreme Court has finished with an av-
erage of 7.9% more of the total vote than the candidate who trailed that ticket.
By contrast, the average difference for high and low candidates for the Court of
Criminal Appeals on the same ticket was only 2.9%.26  In simple terms, this
means that more voters have looked to something other than party labels in
choosing justices of the Supreme Court than they have when choosing judges of
the Court of Criminal Appeals.
The results of primary races for nomination to the Supreme Court races
show even more dramatically the importance of campaign funding.  On three
occasions during this decade, broadly supported candidates with extensive me-
dia campaigns have been challenged by insurgents with no organized support
and only minimal funding.27  In each instance, the established candidate has
won a substantial statewide victory while actually losing in those areas of the
state where no television advertisements were aired.28
                                                          
26. The differences each year between the high and low polling candidates for Republican Party
candidates in contests with Democratic opponents were as follows:
Supreme Court Court of Criminal Appeals
High GOP Low GOP Difference High GOP Low GOP Difference
1990 59.2% 43.6% 15.6% 48.9% 43.9% 5.0%
1992 53.3   43.2   10.1   50.5   47.2   3.3   
1994 56.8   56.2   0.6   54.5   54.0   0.5   
1996 56.3   52.0   4.3   55.5   53.5   2.0   
1998 60.1   53.5   6.6   57.8   54.0   3.8   
The difference between high-polling and low-polling Democratic Party candidates with Republican
opponents is the same for all years except 1992 and 1996, when the presence of Libertarian candidates
in the Supreme Court races led to these results: 1992, High Dem 56.8%, Low Dem 43.1%, Diff 13.7%;
1996, High Dem 45.5%, Low Dem 40.6%, Diff 4.9%.
Thus the average difference between high and low-polling Republican candidates for the Supreme
Court is 7.4%, while the average Democratic difference is 8.3%.
27. The challengers were former Justice Charles Ben Howell, a perennial and occasionally suc-
cessful judicial candidate, against both Dallas Court of Appeals Chief Justice Craig T. Enoch in 1992
and incumbent Justice Nathan L. Hecht in 1994, and Austin attorney Steve Smith against incumbent
Justice Deborah G. Hankinson in 1998.  Neither Howell nor Smith won the endorsements of any
newspapers, the support of any major elected official or public figure, or the support of any bar group.
The results of the State Bar of Texas Judicial Polls were as follows: 1992, Enoch 50.7%, Howell 10.0%;
1994, Hecht 58.2%, Howell 5.5%; 1998, Hankinson 49.3%, Smith 19.6%.  Source:  Secretary of State of
Texas, Official Election Results.
28. This summary chart shows the impact of television advertising:
Year Winning Candidate % of Vote in TV
Markets with Ads
% of Vote in TV
Markets without Ads
Overall % of Vote
1992 Enoch 61.1% 42.6% 59.9%
1994 Hecht 64.6   47.7   61.0   
1998 Hankinson 60.8   48.7   59.4   
Source: Karl Rove & Co., Austin, Texas; Secretary of State of Texas, Official Election Results.
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Thus, while roundly deplored, “the ritualized scandals of political spend-
ing”29 in Texas judicial elections have given many voters enough information to
cast something more than a random vote.30  Republicans also lost slightly more
positions than Democrats in 1996, when most of Governor George W. Bush’s
judicial appointees in East and South Texas were defeated.  Furthermore, in
many races, there are profound differences between the qualifications of candi-
dates.  For most if not all states, the formal qualifications for judicial office are
so minimal that almost any lawyer who has reached a certain age and is not cur-
rently disbarred is eligible to serve.  In states like Texas that are under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, preclearance of enhanced qualifications is not likely
to be obtained.
Professor Carrington does provide an answer for those who would press for
an informed electorate.  He says, “The key to any comprehensively effective
solution to the problem of judicial elections is to provide modest public fund-
ing.”31  He urges the institution of publicly funded and distributed voter’s
guides, with inclusion perhaps conditioned on a candidate’s forgoing additional
funding or forswearing negative television spot advertising.  I support the crea-
tion and distribution of voter’s pamphlets, and I hope that Congress will en-
                                                          
29. Charles W. Wolfram, What Will the Tobacco Fees Set in Motion?, NAT’L L.J., Dec.
28,1998/Jan. 4, 1999, at A25.
30. The inability to conduct visible campaigns has left down-ballot judicial candidates in Texas es-
pecially vulnerable to partisan sweeps.  This was particularly true in the 1994 general election, when
incumbents in opposed races fared as follows:
Court Republicans Democrats
Won Lost Won Lost
Supreme Court   1 - - -
Court of Criminal Appeals - - -   1
Courts of Appeals - - 3 10
District Courts 10 - 5 21
Total 11 - 8 32
Thus, the Texas judiciary suffered almost a seven per cent turnover in a single day, not counting the
five Democrats and one Republican who were defeated for renomination in their primaries.  The turn-
over would have been even greater had not 115 Democratic incumbents (as compared to 71 Republi-
cans) been unopposed in general election.
Democrats also lost a number of seats in 1984, when Ronald Reagan’s coattails swept nearly every
Republican candidate in the state’s four largest counties to victory.
In contrast, many able incumbent judges running as Republicans were defeated in 1982, when
Governor William P. Clements was defeated for re-election in a statewide Democratic sweep.  The
results for that year were as follows:
Supreme Court - - - -
Court of Criminal Appeals - - - -
Courts of Appeals  2 10 - -
District Courts 15 15 14 -
Total 17 25 14 -
Source:  Secretary of State of Texas, Official Election Results.
31. Carrington, supra note 1, at 119 (emphasis added).
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courage their use by providing a free franking privilege for state or local gov-
ernments who distribute them.  However, I question whether such initiatives
will provide enough information and generate enough interest to displace the
candidates’ own advertising.32
If public funding is to be a “comprehensive solution,” it must be substantial,
not modest.  It must completely displace private donations, because public
funding that merely supplements existing systems will do almost nothing to en-
hance the appearance of fairness and integrity that judicial elections can erode.
It must be generous enough to permit voters to make the right choices among
the candidates offered to them, not leave them choosing blindly between names
or political parties.  Lawyers’ occupation taxes or court fees could be tapped to
fund most of this regime.
Although more than twenty states have some form of public funding, only
Wisconsin provides any meaningful assistance to judicial candidates, and no
state has displaced the private system in the way either Professor Carrington or
I have suggested.  But it seems axiomatic to me that if any public funding re-
gime is established, the judiciary should be included first.
Absent public funding, Carrington might respond that even if money makes
a difference and even if it matters who wins, campaign contributions should be
prohibited because their appearance is so damaging to the judicial process.  The
most that Carrington concedes is that “most lawyers and litigants who contrib-
ute to campaign funds are, in their own minds, not trying to bribe judges, but
only want a judiciary who is not hostile to their interests.”33  This seems to me
far too cynical.  Most active trial lawyers want judges to move cases efficiently
with few reversible errors, not to be a “friend” on the bench.  Even in appellate
court races, many lawyers and lay people contribute primarily out of a per-
ceived professional or civic obligation to support able public servants, not out
of a hope to buy a philosophical predilection.
Others cannot believe that a judge who accepts campaign contributions will
be impartial.  While Carrington does not buy this line, the “Payola Justice”
tract he references queries:  “Could Texas Supreme Court justices be schizo-
phrenic enough to rake in $1 million in campaign contributions with one hand
while impartially swinging the gavel with the other?”34
The answer, of course, is Yes.35  If judges are so weak as to be influenced by
a contribution that goes only to their campaign coffers to pay election expenses,
                                                          
32. The State Bar of Texas placed basic candidate information for all state appellate and trial
court candidates on its website in 1998, but received only about 500 “hits.”  And in Texas, major news-
papers and the League of Women Voters have long printed comprehensive Voters’ Guides.  Never-
theless, official voters’ guides do seem to have received much greater attention in those jurisdictions
where they are in use.
33. Carrington, supra note 1, at 112.
34. TEXANS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, PAYOLA JUSTICE 3 (1998).
35. See William Powers, Jr., 60 Minutes’ Report Unfair to High Court, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Nov. 15, 1998, at 6J.  The authors of “Payola Justice” provided no specific correlation between contri-
butions and votes, probably because such evidence was lacking.  As Professor William Powers, Jr., of
the University of Texas Law School has concluded:
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how could they possibly resist the pressures common to all judges of personal
friendships and professional associations among those who appear before
them?  They can and do resist because judges make their rulings within the
numerous formal and informal constraints that surround the process of the rule
of law.36
Nevertheless, several public opinion polls across the nation have shown
nearly universal public skepticism about whether judges are in fact impartial in
cases involving contributors.  In Texas, for example, a recently completed sur-
vey reported that forty-three percent of respondents felt that contributions to
judges have a “very significant” influence on decisions made by judges in the
courtroom, forty percent felt they had a “somewhat significant” influence, and
only seven percent felt they influenced decisions “not at all.”37  Do such results
justify banning contributions?
Not necessarily.  In the same poll, sixty-nine percent of respondents rated
Texas courts as “very” or “somewhat” honest and ethical (the Texas Supreme
Court was so rated by seventy-seven percent of respondents).38  About two-
thirds of those polled thought Texas judges were highly qualified (sixty-six per-
cent), and three-fourths believed that Texas courts followed the law in per-
forming their duties (seventy-five percent).39  Almost three-quarters (seventy-
three percent) felt that they would be treated fairly if they had a pending case
in a Texas court, and sixty percent of those with Texas courtroom experience
rated the services they received as very or somewhat good, while only thirteen
percent rated them very or somewhat poor.40
These numbers reflect something profound:  Either citizens are so cynical
they do not expect any public official to be beyond reproach, or they do not
value absolute impartiality as an essential judicial prerequisite, or they treasure
a viable election process so highly that they are happy to permit a “little play in
the joints” to retain their control at the ballot box.  After all, two-thirds of
those surveyed thought that Texas judges were accountable to the public for
their actions (sixty-seven percent), and an even greater margin said judges
should be “elected by the people” rather than “appointed by the Governor
                                                          
At Chief Justice Phillips’ request, I recently analyzed his votes in the decisions used in the
“Payola Justice” study.  That analysis demonstrated that there was no positive relationship
between contributions by lawyers and his votes.  Lawyers he voted against contributed
slightly more money than lawyers he voted for.  I suspect the other justices have similar vot-
ing records, although I haven’t examined other data in detail.
Id.
36. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, What I Ate for Breakfast and Other Mysteries of Judicial Decision
Making, in JUDGES ON JUDGING: VIEWS FROM THE BENCH 71 (David M. O’Brien ed., 1997); Gregory
C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind:  An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning,
73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377 (1998).
37. SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATION AND STATE BAR OF
TEXAS, PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE COURTS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN TEXAS
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subject to retention elections where people vote to determine whether the
judge should remain in office” (seventy percent to twenty percent).41
Finally, the poll demonstrates that the effect of campaign contributions is
only one of several negative aspects about the administration of justice.  Less
than half the respondents agreed that Texas courts are effective in informing
the public about court procedures and services (forty-six percent), or that court
cases are concluded in a timely manner (forty percent), or that the average per-
son can afford court costs and filing fees (twenty-five percent).42  Clearly the is-
sues of access to justice, as well as judicial selection, must be more forcefully
addressed if public confidence in the courts is to be strengthened.
IV
CONCLUSION
From his survey of past and present difficulties in American judicial selec-
tion, Professor Carrington offers some excellent ideas about how to do a better
job of choosing judges.  As both an observer and a participant in one of our na-
tion’s more rambunctious judicial selection systems, I see the strengths and
weaknesses of some proposed changes somewhat differently than he does.  But
my disagreements are almost entirely in emphasis, not overall direction, and
they in no way lessen my respect for his scholarly and thoughtful approach to
these knotty issues.
Money in a judicial election is a big problem, but a judicial election without
money is not the answer.  If a state insists on keeping the election system, the
state should adopt a comprehensive system of adequate public funding, or else
use retention elections where every judge will face the voters but few will have
to mount a serious, well-funded campaign.
In states with elections, legislatures and Supreme Courts should make in-
cremental reforms through candidate regulation by imposing reasonable con-
tribution limits, proscribing outrageous campaign tactics, and mandating the
full and timely disclosure of all campaign finance activities.  The recent recom-
mendations of the American Bar Association Task Force on Lawyers’ Political
                                                          
41. See id.  Other statewide polls have consistently shown more public support for merit selection.
In November 1995, a Baselice & Associates survey for Texans for Lawsuit Reform found that 74%
favored merit selection and retention elections for appellate judges, a slight increase over the 71% who
favored that method in a March 1995 Tarrance Group Poll.  In April 1993, the Harte-Hanks Texas Poll
found that 61% of Texans supported merit selection.  In January 1990, a Shipley and Associates Poll
found that Texans favored merit selection over the current system 48% to 42%.  In Winter 1989, the
Texas Poll found that voters favored gubernatorial appointment with voter or legislative approval over
partisan or nonpartisan elections 50% to 38%.  In Fall 1984, a Texas Poll found that voters supported
gubernatorial appointment and voter approval of judges 57% to 29% over the current system.
In general, these poll questions have explained the merit selection process in some detail.  When
the question is worded differently, however, strikingly different results can be obtained.  In March
1988, for example, 86% of Texas Democratic Primary voters said “Yes” to this nonbinding referenda
question:  “Texans shall maintain their right to select judges by direct vote of the people rather than
change to an appointment process created by the Legislature.”
42. See SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, supra note 37.
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Contributions, suggesting these and other reforms, deserve serious considera-
tion.
